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GOVERNANCE TOWARDS A
GREEN FUTURE
May Thorseth and Fabian Schuppert
1 Introduction
Achieving a green future for all is – as the other chapters in this book have shown –
no simple task. Some of the key limitations and obstacles to sustainable development
and to avoiding the dangerous consequences of environmental change are partly
due to the structures and workings of political institutions. In order to govern in
accordance with the vision of a green future for all, one needs the right kinds of
institutions, norms, principles, actors and power balances. As discussed throughout
this book, we take a human rights-based approach to be particularly promising,
since enshrining ethics of a green future would provide us with an established
political, legal and moral starting points for distributing entitlements, responsi-
bilities, duties and burdens so as to make a green future for all possible. However,
as this chapter will show, environmental governance is an extremely complex ﬁeld
and it thus would be naive to assume that the establishment of rights to a green
future would in and of itself provide a panacea for existing shortfalls in governance
practice.
The aim of this chapter is to bring together some of the key observations made
in the other chapters, to utilise the rights-based framework developed earlier and to
address particular challenges to devise legitimate and eﬀective governance for a
green future. In so doing, we will draw on a couple of cases that demonstrate
obstacles to sustainable politics and governance following from the prevailing discourses
of (un)sustainability, economic feasibility and national interest short-termism. In
response to these issues, we will highlight possible roads to sustainable politics and
governance which draw on the idea of rights to a green future and which seem to
require institutional changes, motivational changes and a shift in sustainability dis-
courses in order to address – among many other issues – the diﬀerences between
aﬄuent and poor countries more adequately.
As it stands, existing environmental governance practice has signiﬁcant deﬁcits,
no matter whether regarded at the local, regional, national, transnational or global
level. Some of the problems seem to stem from democratic governance, since, for
example, the attitudes of political decision makers in democracies can be expected to
have a great deal of overlap with those of their constituencies, which means that the
limitations of future-oriented moral attitudes and the motivational barriers to future-
oriented action of citizens are likely to have a considerable impact on politics. At the
same time, though, many transnational institutions for environmental governance
lack democratic legitimacy and accountability. Additionally, many environmental
policies tend to be implemented according to standardised procedures in accordance
with internationally acknowledged rules and regulations, such as Agenda 21, many of
which are controversial from the normative viewpoint of intergenerational global
justice and sustainability. On top of this, politics in general struggles to adequately
prepare for and regulate in light of future risks and uncertainties. In other words, to
make our world future-proof is something politics struggles with because of its gen-
erally ﬂawed understanding of risk. Last but not least, a particular obstacle to
achieving a green future for all concerns how the diﬀerences between developed and
developing countries tend to be glossed over, and the way in which global power
politics shapes the normative landscape of global to local governance regimes.
Our approach in this chapter is to ﬂag up how roads to sustainable politics
depend on a successful interplay between the right kind of normative framework,
the wide use of diﬀerent governance tools, careful institutional design and underlying
motivational driving forces. We hope to show that in order to succeed we need to
look for roads in plural, i.e. roads that are suitable for the diﬀerent contexts of
sustainable politics and that achieve a green future for all.
In the following sections we will ﬁrst outline a generic overview of issues in
relation to environmental governance. We will touch on issues such as the rebound
eﬀect, future-prooﬁng policymaking, and motivational obstacles to sustainability,
before moving on to three concrete cases which will make the issues discussed
tangible and which highlight the need to contextualise our governance responses.
In section 7 we connect our discussion on governance to important ﬁndings from
the other chapters of the book. Finally, in section 8 we oﬀer some concluding
remarks on roads to sustainability.
2 Global environmental governance: some preliminary remarks
The focus in this section is to give a brief generic overview of global environ-
mental governance and its multifaceted nature. First of all, it is important to be clear
about what falls under the umbrella term ‘governance’. Governance refers to pro-
cesses of governing, including the agents that participate in particular practices of
governance. Hence governance is not limited to actions and structures of states but
also includes markets, trade, law, civil society, networks and individuals. Moreover,
tools for governance come in many diﬀerent shapes and forms, including but not
limited to laws, norms, treaties, language, culture and power.
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Environmental governance proves to be particularly complex since its object,
that is, the environment, is aﬀected by a whole range of processes, practices and
policies, including those that are not directly aimed at the environment and occur
on many diﬀerent levels. Moreover, ‘the environment’ as the object of governance
is in itself too opaque and complex to be treated as a uniﬁed whole. This is perhaps
why we often see that laws, norms and treaties within environmental governance
normally single out particular aspects of the environment that they aim to regulate,
such as the levels of toxins in soil and water or the taxation of fossil-based com-
bustibles. When over ten years ago Ronald Mitchell (2003) counted the number of
international environmental agreements, there were more than 750. This number
has been increasing even further since. There is a vast array of bilateral, multilateral,
transnational, international and global environmental governance norms, treaties
and principles, spanning the whole spectrum from the informal via soft law to hard
law. For the remainder of this section we will focus on a few key examples and
explain some of the main prospects and challenges of international environmental
governance.
One aspect of the current global environmental governance regime that is
particularly often subject to criticism is the fact that the current system is very
fragmented, with no central and powerful environmental agency in place by which
it could shape international policy and exert a certain amount of pressure onto
non-complying states to be more sustainable. Critics argue that the world needs a
stronger central agency for environmental matters since existing institutions like the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) lack the cohesion, power and
political support to adequately address global environmental issues, especially if
individual states oppose UNEP’s policies. This criticism often goes hand in hand
with the observation that international environmental law lacks the backing of an
international court solely designed to adjudicate environmental disputes. While the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is in theory equipped with the power to process
environmental cases, in its actual practice the ICJ has not only never used
its existing (on paper) environmental chamber, but it has also treated the few
environment-related cases it had in a distinctly non-environmental way, that is,
strictly in terms of whether particular international agreements had been violated
(for details, see Stephens 2009). Therefore, some commentators have called for the
establishment of an international court of the environment, a forum in which
newly enshrined environmental rights could be claimed and protected.
Both these proposals, i.e. the suggestion that states should create a world envir-
onment agency as well as an international court for the environment, point to
problems with a central feature of the current global environmental governance
regime, namely, the fact that most environmental governance is based on voluntary
collaboration between states, supported by customary norms, non-binding agree-
ments and other soft law instruments. Some critics think it would be better to have
binding norms which are centrally enforceable, which is one of the primary reasons
why these critics call for the establishment of a central agency and a court of the
environment. It is true, that the bulk of existing global environmental governance
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tools is not intended to strictly enforce environmental goals and establish legal
liabilities for parties that fail to comply, but rather to develop and sustain colla-
borative eﬀorts among individual sovereign states to make our world safer and
more sustainable. However, while this approach has obvious downsides (e.g. no
legal enforceability of most norms) and a mixed track record (e.g. the slow and
thus far insuﬃcient response to global anthropogenic climate change), it should be
noted that this approach has also delivered on several occasions (e.g. the phasing
out of CFCs through the adoption of the Montreal Protocol) and that stricter
regulations might be hard to establish, which means one should be careful not to
throw out the child with the bathwater. For instance: past attempts to establish
strict liability principles, such as the Council of Europe’s (CE) Convention on Civil
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,
have been ill-fated. All that was needed to put the CE’s convention into eﬀect was
its ratiﬁcation by three member states. However, in the end, the convention failed.
It is not very surprising, then, that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of Principles,
which was adopted at the end of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, does not propose any liability mechanisms, but only mentions
liability as a future principle (see Chapter 5).
For better or worse, it is therefore still sovereign states that wield signiﬁcant
power within the existing international environmental governance regime. It is
states that are the parties to existing multilateral environmental agreements and it is
often (no matter whether openly or covertly) state interests that shape policies,
recommendations and norms developed within existing environmental governance
institutions. The eﬀects of state-led global environmental governance vary sig-
niﬁcantly. While the 1992 Earth Summit is often credited with establishing the
precautionary principle in international environmental governance, Agenda 21,
which was intended to put the idea of sustainable development into law, has been
heavily criticised for being too business-friendly and neoliberal in its outlook.1
Precaution and sustainable development are both among the ten core principles of
the existing global environmental regime. The other eight principles are: cooperation,
sovereignty, no harm, sustainable use, equitable use, intergenerational equity, the
polluter pays principle and common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities (Stephens
2009). Even though most of these principles are not without controversy, they
provide the backbone of today’s climate and environmental governance. Hence it
is not surprising that all these principles have played a major role within the
negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Principles like precaution have gradually changed the discursive governance landscape,
leading to a partial shift in justiﬁcatory logic from something being permissible until
shown to be harmful to a more precautionary approach, which calls for scientiﬁc
evidence to show that certain actions are not harmful and to adopt the strategy
‘better safe than sorry’ (see section 4).
What is important when talking about global and international environmental
governance is to disaggregate its various dimensions. Apart from the obvious, that
is, the political and legal dimensions, environmental governance includes an
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economic dimension, a social dimension, a psychological dimension and a
technological dimension.
The political dimension, as pointed out above, is dominated by the governments
of sovereign states. It is states that shape agendas and make agreements, while there
is basically no democratic control over the myriad of transnational environmental
organisations that exist. This points to the worry about a distinct lack of legitimacy
in current environmental governance arrangements. Environmental governance is
often technocratic, since it is elites and experts who decide what kind of policy is
adopted and for which reasons. While the rise of expert-led policymaking is in part
due to the complexities of the environmental problems we face today, there is a
worry that important decisions about societal risk-taking and future well-being are
made by a group of unelected technocrats, bureaucrats and industry representatives.
Thus, many governance schemes lack democratic legitimacy and accountability,
that is, they are not democratically controlled.2
The legal dimension, as also pointed out above, is dominated by soft law
instruments, since global environmental hard law is somewhat underdeveloped and
diﬃcult to enforce within the existing legal fora. At the same time the imple-
mentation, interpretation and enforcement of new and existing legal tools is crucial
for advancing the future-prooﬁng of society. However, in some cases diﬀerent
legal and normative orders conﬂict with one another, such as for instance in the
case of EU-imposed border tax adjustments for making sure that the EU’s internal
carbon tax/emissions trading regime would not disadvantage EU products, which
some lawyers deemed to be incompatible with existing WTO legislation.3
The economic dimension does not only concern the costs of adopting certain
measures, such as whether the countries of the developed global North should
compensate Ecuador and its citizens for the income they forgo by choosing to
preserve the Yasuni National Park and its biodiversity rather than exploiting the
large amounts of oil reserves that were discovered below the park (see section 6).
The economic dimension also includes questions such as whether one should
invest more in alleviating poverty or saving the environment.
The social dimension is about the social costs and eﬀects of environmental gov-
ernance, while the social support for and the eﬀectiveness of particular governance
measures is tightly connected with the motivations and preferences of diﬀerent
actors, an aspect that is captured by the psychological dimension (see more on this
in Chapter 9).
Last but not least, the technological dimension of environmental governance
includes the use of diﬀerent technologies and their feasibility, including renewable
energies such as tidal energy or the potential use of so-called ‘geo-engineering
techniques’.
As argued earlier in the book, one key element we believe to be crucial for
strengthening the enforceability and stringency of environmental governance are
environmental rights (see Chapter 2). However, environmental rights come in
many ways, shapes and forms. Normatively speaking one ﬁrst of all needs to dif-
ferentiate between individual environmental rights and collective environmental
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rights, as well as between rights whose bearers are humans only, humans and other
animals, or no humans but the environment as such. Depending on which nor-
mative framework one chooses one can end up with very diﬀerent environmental
rights, not only in terms of their direct content, but also their scope and demanding-
ness. Generally speaking – with regard to the content of environmental rights – large
diﬀerences exist, since some environmental rights express general claims to a
vaguely deﬁned valuable good, such as rights to a safe environment. Other envir-
onmental rights express direct entitlement rights, such as rights to clean and suﬃcient
water, or rights to life-sustaining ecosystem services. However, it is also possible to
frame environmental rights as rights of the environment, or of animals or ecosystems;
this way of framing environmental rights intends to establish strong non-human
rights claims in order to curb humans’ negative inﬂuence on the planet and its
non-human inhabitants. In many other cases environmental rights are intended to
express the idea that a healthy and safe environment is a necessary condition for the
prolonged fulﬁlment of most other rights.4 Therefore, environmental rights are
sometimes seen as meta-rights, or the legal expression of meta-capabilities (that is,
the things we need to be able to do in order to be able to be capable of anything –
if we are to work, for instance, we need to be able to breathe) (for a detailed
argumentation on this, see Chapter 2). Furthermore, one of course needs to dis-
tinguish between philosophical theories and accounts of environmental rights and
politically and legally existing environmental rights. The distinction between the
moral dimension of rights as diﬀerent from political and legal rights is important,
since the practice of environmental rights and laws can obviously deviate quite
signiﬁcantly from the initial normative underpinnings and intentions. While legal
and political interpretations of constitutional environmental rights naturally vary,
the existence of such rights provides a huge normative resource for progressive
sustainable governance. At the same time, the legal acceptance of environmental
rights can always only be part of a more complex solution, since rights – in order
to be eﬀective – need enforceability, accountability and responsibility to go along
with them. Our discussion throughout the remainder of this chapter will highlight
the importance of rights-based environmental governance across a range of issues.
Global and international environmental governance touches upon all of the
issues discussed earlier in this book, including risks, rights, economics and the rela-
tionship between aﬄuent and poor countries. We will discuss these issues
throughout the following four sections, using three particularly informative examples
in order to explain the issues at hand: the case of the Guangdong ﬁsheries (case 1);
the Sardar Sarovar (Narvada dams) in India (case 2), and the failure of the Yasuni–
ITT Initiative (case 3). Cases 1 and 2 illustrate a huge range of governance issues
related to: lack of coordination, context-blind coordination of Agenda 1, misplaced
expertise, conﬂicting interests between nutrition and sustainable politics, lack of
solidarity within the current generation, and the need for collective environmental
rights. Case 3 relates in particular to developing countries, and analyses the case
from diverse angles, thus aiming to shed light on normative dilemmas. All these
cases illustrate the complexity of the normative, social, political and economic
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demands shaping environmental governance and allow us to ﬂesh out the normative
potential of using a rights-based approach to sustainable governance.
3 Governance towards intergenerational justice
In this section of the chapter we will focus on the diﬃculty of representing future
generations in democratic and international decision-making practices, especially
with regard to possibly fulﬁlling the wide-ranging demands of intergenerational
justice. In so doing we shed light on both the utter dependence of future genera-
tions on the decisions and policies of current people, as well as the worrying lack of
long-termism in current democratic institutions (see more on this in Chapter 6).
3.1 Representation of future generations
Initially we need to decide how to deﬁne ‘future generations’. We shall argue that
there is a need to extend the scope beyond national societies, and also beyond the
human species, i.e. to an anthropocentric view that also includes nature not just as
an object to serve human interests. Further, we shall argue that our current ethical
commitments are internally connected with our obligations towards future gen-
erations (Alvarez and Thorseth 2015). The question whether and how to represent
future generations is complex, as it raises questions such as whether we can harm
people we do not yet know, and who have not yet been born. We shall leave aside
the non-identity question discussed extensively by Parﬁt (1986). Rather, we shall
argue that currently living people have commitments towards future generations
for reciprocity reasons. Reciprocity can be considered a possible moral motivation
to conserve natural resources for the sake of future generations. There are reasons
for paying forward the beneﬁts we enjoyed from past residents of our common
planet earth. One reason is akin to John Rawls’s idea of just savings for the stability
of the basic structure of the society of future generations (see Rawls 1971, section 44;
see Meyer 2008). The amount of savings should be suﬃcient for future generations
to continue with a society stable enough for members to meet their own needs, to
fulﬁl their obligations to one another and to contribute to their just savings for
their future generations (Alvarez and Thorseth 2015). This is also based on the
most prevailing deﬁnition of ‘sustainable development’:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987
aka Brundtland Commission 1987)
Governance towards intergenerational justice thus presupposes intragenerational
justice as well, or so we shall argue. Brieﬂy, this is because we do face conﬂicts
having to do with the fact that we may have to choose between, on the one hand,
protecting the environment in order to meet intergenerational challenges, and on
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the other, avoiding the exacerbation of inequalities among those presently living
(see Chapter 8 on developing countries).
3.2 Sufﬁcientarianism, frugality and the rebound effect
Suﬃcientarianism is a theory of distributive justice. Rather than being concerned
with inequalities as such or with making the situation of the least well oﬀ as good
as possible, suﬃcientarian justice aims at making sure that each of us has enough.
The problem is, however, that we need to make sure that limited resources are
compatible with a certain standard of living for all. Thus, frugality among the rich
should in principle contribute to the right direction, i.e. towards inter- and intra-
generational justice. In order to govern towards inter- and intragenerational justice
there is one particular obstacle that has to be overcome, though. This is the
rebound eﬀect. Brieﬂy speaking, the rebound eﬀect may be described as an unin-
tended eﬀect of frugal behaviour in the rich world. The reason is that frugal
behaviour causes new consumption by others (Alcott 2008: 7). As an example,
technological improvement results in improved fuel eﬃciency, which in turn leads
to more consumption of fuel, as it becomes cheaper.
Frugality through for instance purchase of emission certiﬁcates is often con-
sidered a transfer in the name of equity (Alcott 2008: 15). The problem is that such
aﬄuence-lowering measures address only the rich. In order to make frugality
contribute to a suﬃciency level for all, i.e. to a more equal distribution of available
resources, there has to be a possibility of transfer in purchasing power. It does not
help much if frugality among the aﬄuent is not transferred to purchasing power for
the poor. Brieﬂy, the problem remains as long as the poor have no power to
change their consumption. Without a transfer in purchasing power to either pre-
sent or future poorer people, frugality among the rich will have no sustainable
impact, with respect neither to intragenerational equity, nor to intergenerational
justice (Alcott 2008: 15). In order to illustrate this point Alcott mentions that
without an explicit transfer, the beneﬁciary of the income eﬀect could be an
aﬄuent neighbour who heats his swimming pool more often. We are sympathetic
to this approach to the rebound dilemma as it gives a fruitful starting point for
criticism of a prevailing regime within sustainability discourses.
In this paragraph we aimed at showing that in order to govern towards intra- and
intergenerational justice we need to enable a transfer of purchasing power in order
to accommodate equality more equal distribution of available resources. Frugality
among the current living will only serve the purpose of suﬃciency while at the
same time avoiding the rebound eﬀect. Only then will frugality among the rich
serve the poor. More importantly, though, is to extend environmental rights to
include non-human nature, which should not be treated as commodities, but
instead as commons. In view of this it is probably misleading to discuss suﬃciency in
terms of a transfer in purchasing power in the ﬁrst place.
While Alcott’s main point is that personal shifts to frugality guarantee neither
present nor intergenerational equality, we would like to focus on the idea that
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environmental rights need to be extended to non-human nature as well. Then it
becomes obvious that even if it were possible to implement a transfer of purchasing
power, this would still be inadequate with regard to environmental rights that
include non-human nature. Such rights cannot be treated as purchasable commodities.
Rather, there is a need for another kind of transfer, namely of the sustainability
vocabulary with respect to environmental rights.
4 Uncertainties and risk concerns in future-oriented governance
While law- and policymaking is, at some level, always future-oriented, some
people hold that environmental policies should be particularly ‘future-proof’. In
this section, we will brieﬂy discuss what this might actually mean and how the
taking of certain risks might be deemed acceptable. In the context of global
environmental change, the scale and nature of the relevant risks, the diﬀerent layers
of uncertainty besetting the issue of large-scale and long-term environmental govern-
ance, the temporal scope of the problems (and their possible solutions), and the
evident time lag between decision-making and the materialisation of future positive
and negative consequences make decision-making particularly diﬃcult. The temporal
problem of climate policy is thus a dual one. On the one hand, it takes relatively
long for emissions to negatively aﬀect the climate. Yet policies also come with a
distinct time lag problem of their own, since the presumed beneﬁts of many policy
decisions will only materialise in the not-to-near future. Moreover, many of these
beneﬁts are actually the avoidance of major risks/harms, and thus might not even
be particularly tangible. Many policymakers seem to face (or at least think they
face) a dilemma between choosing policy A and saying to their voters ‘You should
thank me because I just made sure you will have access to aﬀordable energy, great
shopping malls and high speed internet in a year’ and choosing policy B and saying
‘You should thank me because if I had acted diﬀerently your children would be
much more likely to be killed in a ﬂood’. While this contrast is obviously too
crude to be particularly helpful in thinking about the issue, it is important to keep
these concerns in mind for the discussion in this section and the next (section 5).
Further major issues for policymakers with regard to governing climate change
are related to issues mentioned earlier in this book: people’s poor understanding of
the relevant diﬀerences between predictions, models, scenarios and probabilistic
forecasts (see Chapter 4); people’s diﬃculty to understand and normatively assess
the nature of the kinds of risks connected to climate change; the scope and nature
of the various kinds of uncertainties involved. However, the risks associated with
global climate change are so large and serious that it is crucial that we carefully
distinguish between predictions, scenarios and probabilistic forecasts and that we
establish reliable mechanisms for governing issues, technologies and processes and
the corresponding risks (see Chapter 3).
Probably the most often used and most successful attempt at establishing a reli-
able risk governance protocol is the precautionary principle, which has become a
cornerstone of international environmental governance. However, the eﬀectiveness
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of the principle is contested, especially since at the national level precaution is
interpreted in various ways with diﬀerent degrees of stringency (Feintuck 2005).
Moreover, in the context of anthropogenic climate change, policymakers face real
diﬃculties in assessing and regulating future risks. This is particularly true for risks
that are the outcomes of cumulative processes, since it is often diﬃcult to establish
clear chains of causality – which leads to a denial of responsibility – and to give
accurate prognoses of exact eﬀects. One of the key beneﬁts of using a precau-
tionary approach to environmental governance is that it establishes a justiﬁcatory
logic which forces policies to make the case for their being future-proof. However,
at the same time precautionary governance can only be eﬀective and helpful if it
goes hand in hand with the establishment of clear risk thresholds, since taking a
zero-risk approach to technological and political change is simply unfeasible. That
is to say, successful precautionary governance requires a sound normative and
practical understanding of diﬀerent forms of risk and their acceptability.
In order to establish acceptability thresholds for risk-taking scenarios, a rights-based
framework proves invaluable. Deﬁning key basic rights, including environmental
rights, allows us to carve out the diﬀerence between morally permissible and
impermissible risk-taking. However, we want to emphasise that the determination
of acceptability thresholds should be based on a multidimensional metric, not a
monodimensional one. That is to say, instead of calculating risks simply as ‘negative
utility of P times probability of P’ we should be sensitive to the diﬀerent values that
can be aﬀected by particular instances of risk-taking, such as well-being, fairness and
equality, all three of which can be understood either intragenerationally or inter-
generationally. Moreover, one’s framework should be sensitive to diﬀerent kinds of
risks, since irreversible systemic risks should probably be treated diﬀerently from
recoverable isolated risks, even though the latter might involve huge negative utility.
Risk governance, irrespective of the level at which it operates, needs to be
context sensitive, though. That is to say, when dealing with complex environmental
problems it seems naive to assume that we could settle for one-size-ﬁts-all
approaches. Policies that might work in one case may not work in a seemingly
similar case because of a range of external factors (see section 5). Moreover, we live
in a multirisk world (Wiener 2002), so in most cases risk governance is not about
the complete avoidance of certain risks, but about a careful balancing and controlling
of a myriad of potential risks.5 Here we simply aimed to show that the determi-
nation of acceptability thresholds for particular risks and risk governance in general
often have to be settled on a context-sensitive basis.
5 Obstacles to sustainable governance
There are many obstacles to achieving sustainable governance. Additional to the
generic part of this chapter we want to highlight the need for context sensitivity
and real-life implementation by looking into concrete cases of governance
challenges. Within this section and the next, though, we want to leave the more
principled and abstract discussions of the previous sections behind and focus on two
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real-world cases, in order to illustrate the nature and extent of the problems
sustainable governance faces. In this section we ﬁrst describe cases 1 and 2, followed
by an analysis in terms of institutional and motivational obstacles. Case 3 is further
developed in the following section. In focusing on these cases, we want to draw
out the diﬀerent kinds of obstacles that stand in the way of more sustainable
governance. The most serious obstacles are institutional, motivational or both. Let
us ﬁrst present the cases, and thereafter proceed to identifying the character or
nature of the obstacles.
Case 1 Guangdong ﬁsheries in southern China
This case (Ferraro and Brans 2012) concerns the rapid economic growth followed
by strong exploitation of ﬁshery resources in the Guangdong province in southern
China, relating to both the ﬁsh stock and marine environmental deterioration. One
obvious tension here is rather general as it points to the conﬂict between environ-
mental protection and economic development. The case in view demonstrates how
this conﬂict pans out at a local level, due to a range of institutional obstacles. One
remarkable conﬂict is about diverging objectives both at an inter- and intraorga-
nisational level. Brieﬂy, the conﬂict occurs between the national State Oceanic
Administration (SOA) and the Fisheries Management Bureau (FMB), i.e. the
national and the subnational levels. Whereas the former acts as ‘the ruler of the sea’,
the latter acts as ‘the servant of the ﬁshers’ (Ferraro and Brans 2012: 41). The
conﬂict is thus about protection on the one hand and increasing economic growth
on the other. According to Agenda 21 and other international regulations there
are some international conventions to be implemented at the local level in dif-
ferent countries. However, when such objectives are implemented at the local
level, responsibility is often delegated to the subordinate level, which in the
Guangdong case is the provincial level regulated by the FMB. Several obstacles are
present: (i) the policy implementation is captured by informal patron–client-type
relationships (local governmental level); (ii) management responsibility is trans-
ferred to the FMB, which owns a huge ﬁshing company; and (iii) the FMB is
responsible for its own budget.
This case demonstrates how ﬁscal decentralisation leads to bureaucratic frag-
mentation and vertical specialisation: those who are responsible for environ-
mental protection have no direct say in the implementation of the protection
policies, which are governed by those who also have ownership interests in the
ﬁsheries production. In the Guangdong case there is even a further complication
having to do with a certain division at the central level, so that ﬁsheries man-
agement and environmental protection remain separate competencies. Now, this
case most likely demonstrates more than an average amount of institutional
obstacles. Additionally, as pointed out above, the authors found the ‘ruler’ and
the ‘ruled’ to coexist in the same agency, that is, the Federal Management Bureau
being responsible for policy implementation and also being the owner of an
important ﬁshing company.
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The Guangdong case serves as an illustration of institutional obstacles to sustain-
ability, mainly concerning the lack of adequate coordination of action. This ﬂaw
could be described in diﬀerent ways. It is partly a demonstration of the problem of
the public to the extent that the coordination of action at the local level is cor-
rupted, partly due to lack of well-informed actors and institutions. There clearly
also is an institutional obstacle having to do with the strong belief in one techno-
logical model applied indiscriminately, including to contexts where it does not
work – that is, acting according to general international rules and regulations
according to Agenda 21.
Furthermore, the empowerment of people through participation seems to have
little to do with concern for the environment, and a whole lot with the safe-
guarding of nutrition and income. In this particular case there are several reasons
why environmental responsibility is evaporating. Some have to do with patron–client
relationships at the local level, which prevent natural resources and environments
to be governed along democratic lines.
The main point of the authors describing the Guangdong case was to show how
Agenda 21 and other international regulations often work poorly at the level of
policy implementation. Besides, the objective here is not only to illustrate how
overlap of authorities and double accountability may complicate the political process.
Obviously, there is a need for looking in a diﬀerent direction, since the coordina-
tion of formal agencies regulating sustainability policies does not work, at least not
in developing and non-democratic countries.
Some of the problems in the Guangdong ﬁsheries case have to do with the absence
of alternative sources of nutrition and livelihood. In this particular case one may ask
whether responsible ﬁshery is an achievable objective at all. We believe it requires
no further argument that the international organisations’ capacity for solving the
problem institutionally is doomed to fail as long as actions at the global, national
and local levels are poorly coordinated. In the Guangdong case there are certain
values in conﬂict that obviously prevent eﬃcient coordination of action, as we
have seen. The most obvious conﬂicting values have been observed as the double
role of owner and controller co-residing in the same body.
Case 2 The Narmada dams (Sardar Sarovar) in India
This is a project aiming to provide irrigation water to drought-prone areas of
Gujarat (India), as well as electricity to all three states sharing the project. Sardar
Sarovar is a developmental project resulting in the displacement of many rural
people and in environmental degradation, while urban dwellers proﬁted through
an increase in their already high standard of living (Cullet 1995: 33).
Thus, there are diﬀerent groups with claims to the same resources. Intragenera-
tional solidarity becomes an issue when e.g. economic development entails the
improvement of someone’s environment or quality of life balanced by the loss of
other resources and by deprivation for other people (Cullet 1995). What happened
in this case is that the project fed new water-intensive industries near the main
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urban centres without delivering water to its ﬁnal destination – after having dis-
placed an estimated 100,000 people who had to be relocated on new land, which
is not freely available in India. Many rural people were displaced, causing sig-
niﬁcant environmental degradation, while at the same time urban dwellers already
enjoying a comparatively high standard of living beneﬁted. According to Cullet,
Sardar Sarovar stands out clearly as a failure to make all people, or at least the least
well oﬀ, beneﬁt from a development project partly aimed at improving environ-
mental conditions on a regional scale.
In addition to compromising solidarity within the same generation, the Sardar
Sarovar project also illustrates how sustainable development still may entail envir-
onmental deterioration that is not captured by the prevailing concept of sustainable
development. This is a reason why we need to address environmental rights as a
kind of collective right, across and between generations. In the particular case of
the Sardar Sarovar project, an intragenerational injustice is committed towards one
among several groups with claims to the same resources. The case in view
demonstrates how economic development may entail an improvement in the
environment for certain people balanced by loss of other resources for other
people, e.g. the displacement of rural people and environmental degradation ben-
eﬁting urban dwellers. This case also illustrates the kind of injustice discussed in
Rawls, notably the diﬀerence principle – a principle according to which the only
diﬀerences allowed are those that do not disadvantage those less privileged (Rawls
1971). Against this background we may now understand environmental rights as
collective rights aiming at improving the situation of the less advantaged. How
could we make sense of such a concept of environmental rights?
5.1 Institutional obstacles
Lack of coordination (case 1)
Several problems of insuﬃcient or inadequate coordination of action have been
discussed in connection with the Guangdong ﬁsheries case. One main issue relates
to problems of delegating governance to sublevels without safeguarding commu-
nication between the global, national and local levels of governance. This problem
has been identiﬁed as a challenge to the implementation of Agenda 21 locally,
where the aim is to enhance sustainability, to empower people through participa-
tion, and to create ownership of the local project. These goals sound good as long
as they are considered without reference to concrete contexts. However, as shown
by the implementation in the Guangdong case, local conditions are not always
consistent with these aims. This is proved by the lack of enhanced sustainability.
Overﬁshing and environmental pollution were not reduced despite the imple-
mentation of Agenda 21. This case of overﬁshing and pollution also partly illus-
trates what has been discussed in terms of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, i.e. the
problem of each individual trying to gain own proﬁt while at the same time
causing damage to the commons.6
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Context-blind implementation of Agenda 21 (case 1)
Local Agenda 21 is an example of a transnational policy aimed at sustainable
development in a broad sense. The protection of fragile environments and
the strengthening of the role of local authorities are among the objectives. In the
Guangdong case there are several reasons why these universal intentions do not
translate to the local context. A major problem seems to consist in indiscriminate
and context-blind implementation of a project that is not adjusted to the local
conditions of governance (see Chapter 7 on developing countries). In the particular
case of the Guangdong ﬁsheries, responsibility is delegated to the subordinate level,
which in this case is the provincial level regulated by the FMB. As such, it meets
several obstacles: the policy implementation is (i) captured by informal patron–
client-type relationships (at the local governmental level); (ii) management
responsibility is transferred to the FMB, which owns a huge ﬁshing company; and
(iii) the FMB is responsible for its own budget.
Misplaced expertise (case 1)
Additional to the problem of context-blind implementation of Agenda 21, there is
also a problem in the Guangdong case of misplaced expertise. One aspect of ﬁscal
decentralisation is vertical specialisation, which in this case means that the ﬁshery
management and environmental protection belong to separate organising units.
This is a separation within the Ministry of Agriculture, which governs two main
branches divided between ﬁsheries and marine protection. As a consequence, those
two competencies are kept separate. In order to obtain the goals of less environ-
mental deterioration and less exploitation of ﬁshery resources, it is necessary that
the competencies, or expertise, resides within the same organisational branch.
Instead, in a situation such as in Guangdong, those who are responsible for envir-
onmental protection have no say in the implementation of the protection policies.
Conﬂict nutrition vs. sustainable politics (case 1)
Some of the problems of the Guangdong ﬁsheries case have to do with the absence of
alternative sources of nutrition and livelihood. Thus, there is an initial incompatibility
between the aims of environmental protection and those of economic growth, a
problem often referred to as the ‘entrapment problem’. This problem is typical of
many underdeveloped countries (see Chapter 7 on developing countries). The con-
ﬂict is ampliﬁed because the Federal Management Bureau is responsible for policy
implementation while also being the owner of an important ﬁshing company.
Lack of solidarity within same generation (case 2)
A diﬀerent aspect of institutional obstacles concerns lack of solidarity across current
generations. In the Saradar Sarovar case we witnessed a situation of solidarity within
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the same generation being compromised, that is, among diﬀerent people having
claims to the same resources. Although the project beneﬁts some of those con-
cerned, others – primarily poor and rural people – are disempowered. In this case
both disempowered people and nature fall victim to deterioration. In a similar way,
a lack of solidarity with future generations may cause damage to future people, as
well as to the non-human environments, due to pollution and the overuse of
natural resources by the current generation.
Need for collective environmental rights (cases 1 and 2)
The idea of environmental rights draws upon human rights in one important
respect: broadly similarly to the way in which we allocate certain universal rights to
humans, we are urged to think about the environment. The rationale for doing so
is that the environment aﬀects both human and non-human nature, and because
emissions and the utilisation of natural resources aﬀect people and environments far
beyond the contexts in which the actions are carried out. Unlike individual human
rights, environmental rights should be conceived as collective and solidarity rights
(see also Chapter 2). On this account, the rights would be given to communities of
peoples rather than to individuals. This perspective appears to be the most suitable
one, as ‘environment’ does not seem comparable to individual human rights, one
main reason being that it is hard to tell who should be held accountable and
responsible for environmental damages. Talking of protection of the environment in
terms of collective rights also turns the corresponding responsibilities into a collective
concern. Further, such a perspective also requires that the rights encompass
non-human nature, even if it is otherwise anthropocentric.
5.2 Motivational obstacles
Time preferences (case 1)
Short-termism in attitudes and policies has frequently been referred to as an
obstacle to sustainable development for further discussion of motivational obstacles
(see Chapter 9). Partly this has to do with shifting political regimes of diﬀerent
shapes, within democratic as well as non-democratic contexts. Several solutions
have been suggested, among them transnational governance as an alternative to
national and local forms of governance. Some of the arguments emphasise the
need for considering non-human nature and the environment as commons rather
than commodities. As such, nature and the environment are unlike many other
tradable goods and services. In the cases discussed above we have witnessed
vulnerabilities due to short-termism. In the Guangdong case the concern for
meeting the needs for nutrition of the currently living overrides the need to
protect the environments in the interest of other currently living and future
generations. The Sardar Sarovar case, although in a diﬀerent manner, also runs
victim to short-termism, since neither the needs of all concerned people in the
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area nor those of future generations are accommodated, as the project leads to
environmental deterioration.
6 Developed and developing countries
Apart from the many obstacles to sustainable governance discussed above, there
is another issue that further complicates the government of climate change, sus-
tainability and intergenerational justice, namely, the unequal politics between more
developed and less developed states (see Chapter 7 on developing countries). After
setting out some of the general problems surrounding the currently often glossed-
over diﬀerences between developed and less developed states, we will again use a
real-world case: the government of Ecuador’s Yasuni ITT Fund Initiative. This
case nicely illustrates the pitfalls and complexities underlying the common suggestion
of diﬀerentiated responsibilities of more and less developed states.
It is highly important to consider the diﬀerences between individual developed
countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs), since subscribing to universal
moral principles and a human rights-based approach should not be mistaken for
proposing abstract context-blind governance principles. As was pointed out in
Chapter 7, many countries face diﬃcult choices when it comes to where to invest
and which of their obligations to fulﬁl, since economic development, environ-
mental protection and addressing domestic poverty and intergenerational inequity
will not always go hand in hand. In fact, in some cases they might be diametrically
opposed. At the same time, one should be cautious not to let the perceived conﬂict
between development and environmental protection, or between intra- and
intergenerational justice, hegemonise the thinking and discourse around global
environmental governance. There are many diﬀerent ways in which countries can
develop economically, though many of these paths will require certain forms of
international collaboration.
However, in a world marred by unequal trade relations, exploitative foreign
investment practices and a deeply unequal international political system, international
collaboration is a thorny issue. While international collaboration and support appear
to be a crucial element for successfully dealing with an issue as complex as global
environmental change, we need to ﬂesh out ﬁrmly what the slogan of common
but diﬀerentiated responsibilities actually entails for potential duties of DCs to
support environmentally sustainable development in LDCs without reproducing
neocolonial power structures and dependencies. Current practices such as land
grabbing, natural resource exploitation by foreign countries, or the disposal of toxic
electronic waste in LDCs, obviously run counter to the ideal of fruitful collaboration.
The idea of common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities can be cashed out along
diﬀerent normative fault lines, depending on what is taken to be the origin of the
diﬀerentiated responsibilities. Some see the origin of the diﬀerentiated responsibilities
in countries’ historical behaviour and the beneﬁts they might have accrued; others
connect the responsibilities countries have to wealth and the ability to pay. Either
way, it is widely assumed that one of the major dividing lines is the separation of
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highly developed countries from less developed ones. However, whether this dis-
tinction is the correct one remains controversial. Moreover, even if we were to agree
on the origin of the diﬀerentiated responsibilities it is not at all clear how the dif-
ferences in responsibility should be translated into action, since DCs are reluctant to
see themselves as the ones who have to take the ﬁrst step, and vice versa.
Case 3 The Yasuni ITTI
Take the question of global carbon sink conservation as a practical example: global
carbon sink conservation raises a host of normative issues, since it is debatable, for
instance, who should pay the costs of carbon sink conservation, who has the duty
to protect which sinks (especially since not all sinks are terrestrial) and how far the
duty to conserve one’s carbon sinks extends (e.g. is it morally impermissible to cut
down a small part of one’s forests if that creates major beneﬁts for the local popula-
tion?). These normative questions are not of a mere theoretical nature. When
Ecuador discovered major oil reserves under the area of its Yasuni National Park,
the government founded the Yasuni Ishpingo–Tambococha–Tiputini Initiative
(Yasuni ITTI), which asked foreign governments, NGOs and individual stakeholders
to pay into a fund for the conservation of the Yasuni National Park. If by 2023 the
fund would have generated donations of around US$3.6 billion, Ecuador would
leave the oil reserves in the ground; if not, Ecuador would go ahead and extract
the oil. The rationale behind the Yasuni ITTI was clear. Ecuador would preserve
parts of its crucial global carbon sinks (and of the park’s amazing biodiversity), but
the costs of doing so (both direct and indirect) would have to be borne by foreign
governments and other parties. In August 2013, the Yasuni ITTI was declared
unsuccessful, due to insuﬃcient contributions to the UN-administered fund.
The Yasuni ITTI was politically controversial, since some took it to be a case of
ecological hostage taking: instead of ﬁnding a multilateral solution to the environ-
mental challenges we face, Ecuador threatened to destroy part of its public good-
providing carbon sinks in case the international community was not willing to pay.
This seems problematic, since many would hold that Ecuador has a duty of justice
to conserve its tropical forests, as part of global and intergenerational climate justice and
as part of doing their share in governing the global commons. At the same time,
many people hold that the developed states of the global North have a duty to bear
(most of) the costs of fulﬁlling these duties of justice, since the only reason that
Ecuador is in the diﬃcult position to either protect its forests or exploit the oil, is
anthropogenic climate change, which was largely caused by emissions from the
global North. What is absent from this framing of the issue, though, is the question
of the environmental and other rights violated.
Analysis of the Yasuni ITTI
Assessing whether setting up the Yasuni ITTI was legitimate and who is to blame
for its failure, which means that large parts of the national park will be destroyed
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and climate-damaging oil is going to be extracted, very much depends on how one
conceptualises the very problem at hand. If one sees the Yasuni case as part of the
global governance of the commons it seems fair to conclude that by even con-
sidering drilling for oil Ecuador’s government failed to do its share in preserving
the global commons. If one focuses on the idea that the national park with its
massive rain forest is a crucial part of the global carbon cycle, it seems clear that
Ecuador should have a duty to preserve its precious rain forests.
However, one could choose a diﬀerent angle and see the rain forest in the
national park as just one natural resource among many under national control. On
this reading, it goes without saying that Ecuador – like any other country in the
world – has the right to sovereign control over its natural wealth and resources,
meaning that it is up to the people of Ecuador to decide what to do with its forests
and oil reserves. In other words, Ecuador as a self-determining state has the right to
control its resources and to do as it sees ﬁt, which includes the right to extract the
oil and to use the proceeds to advance economic development.
However, there is another rights angle that allows us to advance important
normative claims regarding the Yasuni National Park and its oil reserves: on the
one hand, there are the rights of the citizens of Ecuador, who have a right to be
protected by their state against major risks and harms (whether that is future climate
risks or the current risk of economic deprivation); on the other hand, there are the
rights of the indigenous population within the Yasuni National Park, a group of
Ecuador’s population that lacks equal political rights. These indigenous people
would lose their natural habitat if oil drillings went ahead, without ever being
consulted on what should be done with the national park.
Moreover, one can approach the Yasuni ITTI from a global justice perspective,
focusing on the fact that Ecuador did very little to cause global climate change, that
the most powerful states in the world do little to help countries like Ecuador to
develop economically, and that interfering with Ecuador’s right to self-determina-
tion in the name of global climate governance seems paternalistic and hypocritical,
considering how little DCs do to reduce their own emission footprints.
No matter which of these readings and claims one ﬁnds the most plausible, it
seems that all of the voiced concerns and claims are relevant in this context. This
goes to show that governing natural resources often cuts across a whole range of
levels, from the local level (e.g. the indigenous people living in the Yasuni park), to
the regional level (e.g. locals directly aﬀected by use changes), to the national level
(e.g. the people of Ecuador and the country’s government), to the international level
(e.g. other governments), to the global level (e.g. the users of the global commons).
This of course raises the question at which level decisions should be made, whose
claims should be heard and how legitimacy can be bestowed on such decisions if it is
clear that not all relevantly aﬀected parties can have an equal say in such matters.
Furthermore, one can wonder whether in such cases democratic procedures help or
hinder to achieve the goal of just and sustainable environmental governance.
Having considered the three case studies above and drawing on our analysis from
sections 1–6, the next section will bring the key ﬁndings of the other chapters of
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the book into our governance context, looking for common concerns where we
can proﬁt from further developing our interdisciplinary discussion of ethics of a
green future.
7 Governance in view of remaining chapters of the book
The previous chapters of this book shed light on challenges, hopes and visions for
human rights to a sustainable future for humankind and the environment. In
dealing with rights (Chapter 2) it is claimed that protection of environmental goods
is basic to human rights. Such rights need to be governed. One of the basic chal-
lenges is how to oblige current living people to take upon duties towards future
people who are not yet brought into existence. As an example, there are no people in
the future to reciprocate current people’s actions directed at advantaging future gen-
erations. Perhaps some sort of indirect reciprocity would make sense. One concrete
suggestion is to establish a system where future people could be represented politically,
an arrangement that is further discussed in a separate chapter on political repre-
sentation (Chapter 6). One basic question that is raised is whether there is a need for
environmental rights as such, partly analogous to human rights. One obvious con-
straint for being a rights holder is to be capable of taking upon responsibilities and
corresponding duties. In this respect, it is clear that environmental rights cannot be
compared to individual human rights. This is also a reason why caring for the
environment for all – current and future generations – need to be understood in
terms of a diﬀerent kind of rights for all. Governance of rights privileging current and
future generations on a global scale needs to undertake a careful examination of the
particular contextual conditions. This is what this book aims for, in considering e.g.
legal, economic, motivational and risk aspects in their various contexts.
One reason why general models, or a one-size-ﬁts-all mentality works poorly
when discussing rights to a sustainable future has to do with risks (Chapter 3). Not
only are environmental risks hard to predict in environmental contexts, particularly
due to uncertainty. This is mainly due to the fact that the kind of risks in view are
exempted from the possibility of calculating probabilities. Thus, we have to act
upon the precautionary principle without being able to know exactly what kind of
precautions need to be taken. Besides, one complicating matter is to what extent
people may have rights against risking, as some risks are necessary in order to
appreciate a right to a meaningful life. Additionally, there is also the case that
people experience risks diﬀerently. The contextual stakes are obviously high. At a
governance level a rights-based approach may give a rough guidance with respect
to risks, but this has to be context sensitive.
The lack of knowledge about the future is highlighted in the chapter on sce-
narios (Chapter 4). Any discussion of what might happen in the future has to be
based upon uncertainties, as also discussed in the chapter on risks. In the scenario
chapter, it is argued that scenarios must be based on narratives and informed qua-
litative and fact-based reasoning, warning that policies on environmental rights
must not be based on unchangeable and decontextualised ‘iron laws’.
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The right to life for future generations raises a question whether it would be
possible to safeguard future generations through legal arrangements. A move in
such a rights-based direction has been done in the past, in the United Nations
Conference held in Stockholm 1972, but has not been developed further since
then, e.g. in Rio 1992 (Chapter 5). The way to safeguard future generation was
discussed in terms of environmental rights, as distinct from human rights. As is
pointed out in this chapter there has ever since 1972 been a question of more soft
law, focusing on moral and political rather than legal rights. Still, there is an
environmental linkage in the legal debate between human rights and future gen-
erations. Since it is diﬃcult to allocate rights be it to the environments as such, or
to future generations, there has instead taken place a greening of existing human
rights. A legal approach has to be based in protection of identiﬁable lives, not life as
such. Thus, the current juridical framework puts limits to how far it is possible to
go in the direction of rights to the environments or to future people we do not yet
know who they are. The most promising attempt to accommodate future genera-
tions’ rights to life after the Stockholm 1972 has been the 1998 Aarhus Convention
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, through the actio popularis claim, which includes
future people in terms of ‘members of the public’. As argued in this chapter,
without actio popularis in relation to the environmental damage it is hard to make
claims on behalf of those who will suﬀer in the future. One strategy suggested in
this chapter is to broaden the concept of ‘victim’ and to give room for group-based
rights. Another possible route which was mentioned earlier in this chapter would
be to establish an international court for the environment, which would need to go
hand in hand with a strengthening and extension of existing environmental rights
frameworks, along the lines discussed in Chapter 2.
The possibility of safeguarding future people has been extensively discussed in
terms of political representation of future generations (Chapter 6). The idea to
include future generations through representatives has been set to work in some
democratic contexts, notably within governmental bodies. This far such arrange-
ments, e.g. through an Ombudsman, has not succeeded in coming up with a
model to be embraced by a majority of democratic states. One reason may be
because the focus this far has been on political institutions. As suggested in Chapter 6,
one should rather look to NGOs, ﬁrms and educational institutions in order to engage
the public more directly. Apart from that, one idea suggested here is to have
separate institutions for environmental protection, which could then be a tool to
represent future generations. Again, like in most of the chapters of this book, we
face the problem of assigning particular rights to non-identiﬁable future people.
Economics is still another frame for discussing accommodation of future gen-
erations. The most prevailing problem from an economics aspect is probably the
overuse of common property such that there is not enough left for future people
(Chapter 8). Along with the overuse of common property resources there is also
the underproduction of collective common goods, as well as negative externalities.
Anthropogenic climate change causes negative externalities, and in this chapter, it is
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argued that we cannot escape them. Rather, it is a question of how much envir-
onmental pollution should be justiﬁed? If this argument is sound, the question still
remains to what extent negative externalities in terms of an optimal amount of
environmental pollution is possible to apply to future generations, not least given
the uncertainties and risks discussed in Chapter 3.
The quest for more contextualised or tailor-made arrangements for accom-
modating future generations becomes particularly urgent when discussing devel-
oping countries (Chapter 7). One approach is to focus on economic and ecological
depths, and the question of uncompensated disadvantages for people in developing
countries. One alerting problem is how countries that are not able to accommodate
the current generation should make sacriﬁces for safeguarding future generations.
The resource curse is a particular case in view, i.e. countries who are rich in natural
resources still remain in poverty due to e.g. bad governance, dictatorship, economic
usurpation and others, the main problem often being that political institutions fail
to act impartially in the public interest. The problem of entrapment appears to be a
general problem across the diversity of developing countries, one example being
that investment for future generations seems undoable as long as the current living
are starving. In this chapter, it is argued that there should be less duty for developing
countries to spend resources to protect future generations, as compared to developed
countries. The ‘polluter pay principle’, or ‘beneﬁciary pays principle’ is advanced as
an argument in favour of justifying less duties for developing countries. The main
appeal being made is to the following general, although contextual circumstances
of developing countries: economic vulnerability, institutional weakness and
entrapment. It is further claimed that the problem ought to be viewed as global
rather than national, i.e. we should look for cooperative solutions to the problems.
Besides, it is necessary to look for tailor-made solutions, as developing countries are
diverse with respect to what cases the problems in each particular context.
The need to look carefully into particular contexts is also emphasised in the
chapter om motivation (Chapter 9). The motivational problem connected with
ethics of a green future is identiﬁed as a gap between norms and conformity, i.e.
the problem to act upon what we believe. Four particular obstacles are identiﬁed
in this chapter: time preference, non-reciprocity and uncertainty, of which the
latter two are also discussed in the chapters on rights, risk and political representa-
tion. Additionally, there is also the threat of maintenance of habitualised lifestyles.
These are held to be motivational obstacles to safeguarding a sustainability for
future generations. One main problem discussed in this chapter is the problem of
abstract risks where, in dealing with statistical rather than identiﬁed victims (see
Chapter 5 on legal implementation). Given these problems of motivation, rather
than acting on direct motivations we should instead focus on indirect motivations
(love, pity, care, solidarity), then appealing to the heart, captured in the concept of
‘chain of love’. Self-binding is further discussed as a strategy to handle the moti-
vational problem, internally or through institutions. In doing so, we need to con-
front the abstract models for such arrangements with real-life problems, a task
recommended for ethics as a philosophical discipline.
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8 Concluding remarks
At the beginning of this chapter we said that we would highlight possible roads to
sustainable politics and governance. As our discussion above showed it is indeed
necessary to think of diﬀerent roads rather than a single road in order to address the
problems and challenges that lie before us. The demands of intergenerational justice
and environmental sustainability cut across a host of diﬀerent dimensions and levels,
making it necessary to devise context-sensitive policies. However, in so doing, we
think that three crucial aspects should be kept in mind. First, any lifestyle and
production changes in the most developed countries ultimately only contribute to
a solution if rebound eﬀects are minimised. Similarly, second, a possible move to
suﬃciency and/or frugality has to go hand in hand with a shift in resources and
power to those currently disadvantaged. Consequently, third, following Caney
(2012), environmental policymaking needs to avoid the pitfalls of atomism and
isolationism, that is, climate policy must be contextualised within the wider context
of existing inequalities in economic and political power, vulnerability and coping
capacity. In other words, environmental governance needs to be problem-solving
and context-sensitive, and it needs to address wider inequalities.
Governance in view of the other chapters of this book points to a need for
careful consideration of the particular context for governance of rights to a green
future. In discussing rights there is a quest for adequate human rights, and a corre-
sponding need to ﬁnd ways of regulating such rights. A rights-based approach to
risk problems give us a rough guidance, but then we need to be sensitive to the
context in implementing this at a governance-level. Further in creating scenarios,
politics should not be based on decontextualised hard laws, and when looking for
good ways of governing legal arrangements we should leave room for group-based
rights and a broadened concept of ‘victim’. When setting out to ﬁnd out how to
represent future generations politically it is suggested that we look for suitable NGOs,
ﬁrms and educational institutions rather than embedding the representation in general
political institutions. Economics questions of negative externalities also need to pay
attention to particular contexts in order to decide how much environmental pollution
should be justiﬁed. The discussion of duties of developing countries to accommodate
future generations asks for tailor-made governance arrangements. Lastly, when it
comes to governance aspects of the motivation problem we need to confront our
abstract models with real-life problems, asking what is needed in the particular con-
text in question. This is a challenge for ethics, which we have tried to accommodate
in cooperation with the other ﬁelds of inquiry presented in this book.
In the beginning of this chapter, we raised the question of whether eﬀective
global environmental governance requires the establishment of a global environ-
mental agency or an international court for the environment in terms of a global
enforcing mechanism. However, central decision-making and enforceability are
only two of a range of important aspects which might contribute toward a better
environmental governance system. Therefore, coming to the end of this chapter,
while we still believe that there is a need to look at least in part for global solutions,
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we want to highlight what we emphasised throughout this chapter, namely, that we
should build our solutions around contextualised models of governance mechanisms.
This points to a need for better ﬁt methodologies for governance implementation,
while not losing sight of a global perspective as such. After all, intergenerational
justice, rights to a green future and environmental rights cannot be obtained at
local or national levels in isolation. Still, the governing mechanisms have to work
at all levels in each particular context. The requested context sensitivity seems to be
missing in the governance arrangements we have witnessed thus far.
In light of the issues discussed in this book in general and this chapter in particular,
academics should aim to provide policymakers and activists with at least a rough road
map of how to conceptualise people’s rights to a green future, how to regulate
intergenerational risks and how to implement pathways to sustainable governance.
This is precisely the aim of the research agenda in the next chapter; it sets out where
further research is needed, which issues must be given priority and how we might
address the practical questions surrounding people’s rights to a green future.
Notes
1 Agenda 21 is a non-binding, voluntarily implemented action plan of the United Nations
with regard to sustainable development. It is a product of the 1992 Earth Summit (UN
Conference on Environment and Development). Agenda 21 is an action agenda for the
UN, other multilateral organisations, and individual governments around the world that
can be executed at local, national and global levels. It has been aﬃrmed and modiﬁed at
subsequent UN conferences.
2 Some people of course claim that a lack of democratic control might be a good thing, since
environmental policy (and possibly other policies, too) should not depend on public sup-
port and applause form the constituency, especially in cases in which present well-being’s
losses are necessary for the securing of future well-being opportunities.
3 For a detailed discussion of this case, see Weber (2015).
4 An example of the former kind of rights of the non-human environment is Bolivia’s Law
of the Rights of Mother Earth, while an example of the latter kind of environmental
human right can be found in the South African constitution, ch. two s. 24, which aﬃrms
every citizen’s right to a non-harmful environment.
5 This of course also means that people are vulnerable to risk in more than one way,
making it thus policymakers’ task to socially distribute risks in light of existing inequalities
in risk vulnerability.
6 See Hardin (1968) and Ostrom (1990/2015).
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